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Abstract 
This paper explores the socio-economic impacts and the associated policy 
responses to the collapse of MG Rover at Longbridge in Birmingham. Critically, it 
attempts to move beyond a ‘standard’ Taskforce narrative which emphasises the role 
of the regional response. While recognising that significant policy ‘successes’ were 
indeed evident at the regional level in anticipating and responding to the crisis, a 
wider perspective is required that situates this Taskforce response in (i) a fuller 
understanding of labour market precariousness (that in turn mitigates some of its 
policy ‘successes’), and (ii) more local perspectives that highlight the local impacts of 
closure, the role of the neighbourhood level officials and the third sector in mediating 
these. Taking this broader perspective suggests that longer term, workers face a 
precarious situation and the need for policies to create and sustain ‘good quality’ 
jobs remains paramount. Adding in more local perspectives, a key lesson from the 
Longbridge experience for dealing with closures more generally is that the public 
policy responses must be: multi-dimensional in that they transcend narrow sector 
based concerns and addresses broader spatial impacts; inclusive in that they build 
on a broad coalition of economic and social stakeholders; and, long-term in that they 
acknowledge that adaptation takes many years. If anything, the Birmingham 
Longbridge experience demonstrates the difficulty of achieving such responses in 
the context of crisis where action is imperative and deliberation a luxury.  
Keywords 
Plant closures, taskforces, precariousness, labour market policy, neighbourhood 
effects 
Introduction 
Manufacturing cities in mature economies have faced significant economic 
challenges over the past 30 years, particularly during the most recent economic 
downturn. This has been typified in the UK by a number of high-profile plant 
closures, notably in the automotive sector, with Birmingham and the wider West 
Midlands region in the UK being particularly hard-hit: most notably with the Jaguar 
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plant in Coventry in 2005, MG Rover in Birmingham in 2005, Peugeot near Coventry 
in 2006 and LDV in Birmingham in 2009 (BENTLEY, 2007). Similarly, cities in the 
US, Australia, Belgium, France and Germany have all seen automotive plant 
closures enacted and/or announced in recent years. At the time of writing, Toyota 
has just announced that it will close its Altona Melbourne assembly plant, effectively 
ending mass car production in Australia after a wave of pull-outs by the big players, 
prompting reflection not only on why this has happened but on policy experience 
internationally.1 
In response to such closures, in several cases the  UK Labour Government of 1997 
to 2010 set up Taskforces (task-oriented, temporary, non-statutory partnerships with 
multi-sector but selective membership) to deal with the impacts of plant closures, 
most notably the MG Rover Taskforce. These partnerships became Labour’s default 
vehicle for responding to industrial closure. Taskforces were characterised by their 
diversity in respect of sectoral and spatial remit. However, they had in common the 
provision of an institutional platform to permit rapid mobilisation of expertise and 
resources of national and regional stakeholders in response to economic crisis2.  
This paper reports on the findings of research on the collapse of MG Rover in 
Birmingham in 2005, and explores its socio-economic impacts and the associated 
policy responses.3 The paper highlights what key lessons were learned from what 
happened before, during and after the MG Rover closure in 2005 and the work of the 
Taskforce in tackling this ‘crisis’ situation. The paper responds to long-standing calls 
for a holistic assessment of industrial closure (cf. TOMANEY et al, 1999; PIKE, 
2005). The extant literature is highly compartmentalised, and often demarcated 
                                                            
1 See for example THE GUARDIAN (2014a and 2014b). 
2 Different types of Taskforce model can be outlined in the UK, such as employer-based Taskforces, 
sector-based Taskforces and varying area-based Taskforces (e.g. local, regional and national). Such 
Taskforces can bring together a range of actors to address shock situations. Some Taskforces can be 
seen as reactive and regenerative, operating over short time-scales, whereas others may be more 
proactive and developmental operating over longer time frames (PIKE, 2002), with evolution between 
these modes as the scale and challenge of some shocks or potential shocks unfold. Area-based 
Taskforces may be seen as more likely to try to address longer-term economic restructuring needs.  
Taskforces can in turn be assessed in terms of the degree of multi-level working, the degree of 
devolved responsibility, to what extent a tailored policy response is developed, and also legitimacy 
(and on the latter communication of Taskforce interventions may be key) (BENTLEY et al, 2010b). 
3 The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the UK Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) under award number RES-000-22-2478. For more detail on the MG Rover case 
study, see BAILEY et al (2008). 
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according to disciplinary boundaries. Typically, it focuses on either the impacts of 
closure (e.g. the labour market histories of redundant workers, the resilience of 
localities to rebound from such economic ‘shocks’), or the policy response to closure 
(e.g. area regeneration, Taskforces). A dominant narrative has emerged in respect of 
Taskforces. This is itself highly selective (cf. PIKE, 2002; BENTLEY et al, 2010b), 
focusing on an evaluation of Taskforces according to their own terms of reference as 
an expression of industrial policy (e.g. facilitating the adjustment to closure of supply 
chain companies and redundant workers) or a critique of their multi-level governance 
arrangements (especially their restricted membership and corporatist modes of 
operation).  
Indeed, narratives about Taskforces demonstrate how they take this collaborative 
governance approach at national and regional level to, at least, identify the most 
obvious and immediate problems faced by the newly redundant worker and devise a 
range of policies to help them deal with the problems. Those problems include the 
need to find a new job, the need for training and retraining, the need for financial 
support and, in particular, how to claim social security benefits. At best, Taskforces 
recognise that the newly redundant more broadly require advice on a range of 
financial matters, including entitlement to redundancy payments and pensions, 
advice on the payment of rent, mortgages and loans, but also on coping with job 
loss. There is evidence that the newly unemployed and their families can suffer 
physiological and psychological problems, akin to those associated with 
bereavement (BEER and THOMAS, 2007). Policy responses can include assistance 
with finding a job and (re)training courses, as well as the financial support to do so; a 
range of money advice services; and counselling services. Solutions are found, 
theoretically, to the financial; employment; and the mental and emotional problems 
faced by workers made redundant. Policy responses can be characterised as 
encompassing Financial Services; Employment Services; and Social Welfare 
Services.  
Alternative narratives, especially of broader spatial and social impacts and local 
response, have been marginalised. Thus,  recognising BRISTOW’s (2012) point that 
regions are ‘meeting places’ for local and global forces and debates, we attempt to 
shift beyond this dominant Taskforce narrative, recognising that whilst significant 
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policy ‘successes’ were evident at the regional level in anticipating and responding to 
the crisis, a more comprehensive  perspective is required that situates this Taskforce 
response in (i) a broader context of labour market precariousness (that in turn 
mitigates some of its policy ‘successes’), and (ii) more local perspectives that 
highlight the local impacts of closure, the role of the neighbourhood level officials and 
the third sector in mediating these.   
Overall, this paper therefore attempts to adopt a holistic approach to better 
understanding plant closure in an automotive city, examining: 
 What happened to ex-MG Rover workers after the closure? What have been 
the impacts of UK labour market regulation and the current economic crisis on 
their subsequent labour market experience? 
 What have been the impacts on the communities where these workers lived in 
the city?  
 What types of policy response have been put in place regionally and locally to 
deal with these impacts and have they been successful?4  
Accordingly, the paper is structured as follows. After a brief history to introduce the 
auto cluster in Birmingham and the wider region and MG Rover in particular, 
following sections discuss the data and methods used (notably, the use of a 
longitudinal survey and follow-up interviews), the context of the final collapse, then 
findings in terms of the impact on local labour markets and workers. This is then 
followed by a discussion and consideration of policy efforts and some critical broader 
perspectives going beyond the ‘Taskforce narrative’ before some concluding 
thoughts round off the paper. 
Auto Production and MG Rover in Birmingham and the West Midlands: A Brief 
History 
The West Midlands region is one of the long standing areas of global motor industry 
production. The heyday of production was after World War 2 but, in the following 
decades, with open trade rules and globalisation, the industry declined. A popular 
                                                            
4 On comparisons with policy responses to the Mitsubishi plant closure in Adelaide, Australia, see 
BEER and THOMAS (2009). 
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view is that local companies could not compete in global arenas as a result of 
insufficient investment, poor labour relations, poor quality and cost control, and – 
critically – the lack of a supportive industrial policy on the part of the government. 
Despite a number of foreign takeovers the industry’s fortunes continued to decline. 
The recent closures of the MG-Rover and Peugeot plants effectively ended volume 
manufacture in the region. In parallel there has been a decline in activities by the 
major suppliers. In recent years, Bosch has closed its automotive lighting plant in the 
north of the region and TRW its electric power steering plant in Birmingham. These 
changes have affected employment in the sector with a 34% reduction in the 10 
years from 1997 to 2007 (ONS, 2008).  
Yet in parallel to the decline in volume manufacture, recently there has been a 
relative growth of higher value or specialist production where profit margins are 
greater and which can (therefore) be more sustainable in a high wage cost economy. 
Companies involved range from relatively large producers, such as Jaguar Land 
Rover, through medium sized companies such as Aston Martin to small scale 
producers such as the sports car producer, Morgan Motors. Many of these 
businesses have developed out of the motor sports sector. Alongside this niche 
manufacturing there is a growing (and relatively new) base in engineering design 
and development services ranging from major international businesses like TRW, 
Ricardo and MIRA to small and medium sized companies like Zytec, Prodrive, and 
others.5  
Birmingham as an automotive city in particular has a long history of automotive 
production, dating back to the first factory of the Lanchester Motor Company in 1895. 
The Longbridge plant in south-west Birmingham was set up by Herbert Austin in 
1905. During the subsequent period, the site traded under various names and 
progressively became incorporated into larger corporate entities, growing into a 
major complex rivalling any in Europe. As in many other mature automotive cities, 
                                                            
5 Like SMEs in the volume sector they are also a legacy of past volume based manufacturing but 
differ in two important respects. Firstly, they are largely vehicle (product) oriented rather than 
manufacturing (process) oriented and, secondly, they are in a high value segment of the supply 
matrix. These ‘Knowledge Intensive Business Services’ (KIBS) have largely developed as a result of 
the vehicle makers’ trend towards outsourcing to experts to save on the sunk costs of research and 
development departments. In particular a number of companies are working in areas connected to 
‘green technologies’ including indirect technologies such as telematics systems through to direct low 
carbon vehicle technologies such as hybrid or electric drives. 
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the supply industry grew alongside the car makers and metal-based trades, dating 
from the Industrial Revolution, and was able to adapt to the manufacture of 
automotive parts. Consolidation occurred under the “national champions” industry 
policy approach of the 1950s and 1960s, culminating in the creation of the British 
Leyland Motor Corporation: a conglomerate consisting of Austin, Rover, Triumph, 
Morris and Jaguar (BAILEY et al., 2008). This period coincided with manufacturing’s 
peak in Birmingham and the wider West Midlands6, with manufacturing comprising 
some 65% of total employment in the region by 1961 (BRYSON et al., 1996; cited in 
BARBER and HALL, 2008: 283). At this time, Birmingham and the West Midlands 
were characterised by rapid economic growth and prosperity, based on strengths in 
metal goods, motor vehicle and electrical equipment manufacturing.  
However, the corporate conglomerate entity that was created in the early 1970s 
(then named ‘British Leyland’) was unsuccessful, being characterised by low trust 
between units, poor quality, poor industrial relations, the lack of economies of scale 
and scope, and an inability to recover the (rising) costs of product development 
(BAILEY et al., 2008; WILLIAMS et al., 1994). After nationalisation in 1975, a long 
period of decline set in, with a gradual collapse of sales volumes and offloading of 
non-performing lines. As noted above, the city and the region were strongly hit by the 
recessions and manufacturing crisis of the 1970s and the 1980s, leading to 
significant levels of unemployment (BROWN et al., 2007) and on-going de-
industrialisation. Privatisation in 1985 saw a succession of ownership for what 
became MG Rover: first under British Aerospace, then followed by BMW in 1994. 
During BMW ownership (over 1994-2000) there were significant cuts in employment 
at Longbridge. BMW subsequently divested itself of most of Rover and split the 
company up (BENTLEY, 2000). This involved the rationalisation of production and its 
relocation in the different Rover plants located in different parts of the UK. The Mini 
model, developed by Rover Group, was seen as a promising new premium small car 
which BMW was keen to hold on to, and the Oxford plant had seen heavy 
investment. So not surprisingly, BMW retained the Oxford plant to produce the new 
Mini, which was originally to be based at Longbridge in Birmingham in the West 
                                                            
6 The West Midlands NUTS-2 region is located in central England, and covers an area of around 
13,000 sq. km, from Stoke-on-Trent in the north to Hereford in the South. From 2012 regional 
governance structures – including Regional Development Agencies – were abolished, being replaced 
by more fragmented and less well funded Local Enterprise Partnerships (BENTLEY et al, 2010a). 
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Midlands. Production of the Rover 75 model, then based at Oxford, was shifted in 
the opposite direction, from Oxford to Longbridge. The latter was then sold to a local 
consortium, the Phoenix Group, for a nominal £10 (ten pounds sterling) (BAILEY, 
2003). Land Rover was sold to Ford for £1.8 billion, along with Rover’s design 
facility. 
With the purchase of the Longbridge plant by the Phoenix consortium in 2000, the 
then Labour Government saw a settlement that, despite its inherent weaknesses, 
was politically popular and satisfied trade unions. In consequence it saw the MG 
Rover issue as ‘closed’ and felt that no further action was necessary.  However, the 
Government Office for the West Midlands (GOWM), in private discussions with 
Stephen Byers (the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry) pressed, and 
won the argument, for a package of measures to support businesses most 
dependent on MG Rover and, at the same time, address long-term weaknesses in 
the regional economy.  Thus the Rover Taskforce Report (RTF, 2000) focused on 
the inter-linked themes of modernisation (with funding of £17 million), diversification 
(£19.7 million) and regeneration (£22 million). A further action was to extend the 
existing Accelerate Programme of supply chain improvement outside the confines of 
the then European funded ‘Objective 2’ area to offer support nationally to companies 
in the Rover supply base (BAILEY, 2003). Given the on-going concern about Rover’s 
long term prospects, the first Rover Taskforce (RTF1) also initiated spatial targeting 
via corridors of regeneration. However, the support actions arising out of the first 
Rover Taskforce were, for the most part, not based upon cluster concepts of 
networks but on ‘old fashioned’ industrial policy interventions. 
The ‘final’ collapse of MG Rover in February 2005 then, although widely predicted by 
industry experts, sent shockwaves through the region. Aside from the direct loss of 
some 6300 jobs, the firm’s turnover accounted for as much as 1% of regional GDP 
and £200 million a year in government revenue alone was lost (BAILEY and 
KOBAYASHI, 2008).7  The firm ceased operations owing £1.4 billion to creditors, 
with £109 million owed to UK-based suppliers (HOUSE OF COMMONS, 2006).  MG 
Rover’s inability to pay its suppliers and the resulting cash flow problems in the 
supply chain cut off supply into the factory and caused the final collapse. It also 
                                                            
7 On the decline and collapse of MG Rover, see Bailey and Kobayashi (2008). 
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meant that it was impossible for the administrator to restart production. The collapse 
thus ended 100 years of car making on the Longbridge site. More jobs were lost in 
the supply chain. At first it was thought that as many as 12,000 jobs would be at risk 
but in the end the loss, estimated at 8,500 jobs, was less than initially expected 
(BAILEY and KOBAYASHI, 2008). When this was followed, in late 2006 by the 
closure of the Peugeot factory in Coventry and van maker LDV in June 2009 with the 
loss of 810 jobs, volume production in the region effectively ended, leaving only 
higher-value ‘niche production’ as noted above. Whilst an upsurge in demand, from 
emerging economies in particular, has seen the premium end of the sector benefit, 
with Jaguar Land Rover recently employing additional workers at its plants in the 
region (Bailey, 2013), at the same time current developments in the Eurozone and 
the European auto market create uncertainty for auto firms operating in the UK (with 
mid-range producers such as GM and Honda particularly affected) with an impact on 
the supply chain. 
Methods 
The data used in this article consists of findings from a three-wave longitudinal 
survey of ex-MG Rover (MGR) workers, exploring the labour market experience of 
redundant workers and building on the findings of ARMSTRONG et al. (2008) and 
BAILEY et al (2008). In each wave of the survey, letters were sent to ex-MGR 
workers inviting them to participate in the research via a telephone interview, lasting 
approximately for 20 minutes. This was conducted in accordance with the ethical 
principles of fully-informed voluntary participation, anonymity and confidentiality. The 
third wave of this survey (which is the focus of this paper) was carried out in April 
2008; three years after the closure (see BAILEY et al., 2008 for a more complete 
discussion). 
Ex-MGR workers were first interviewed in July 2005 (wave 1, three months after the 
closure), again in December 2005 (wave 2) and finally in April 2008 (wave 3). In the 
first wave, 273 interviews were conducted with ex-MGR workers. At the second 
wave, 232 interviews were conducted, and in the third wave 204 interviews were 
conducted, with 176 ex-workers across all three waves and 19 new volunteers. The 
demographic profiles of the samples were representative of the MGR workforce. 
Similarly to the MGR workforce, the third-wave sample was 93% male, and the 
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majority (over 70%) of workers aged between 40 and 54 (with an average age of 48 
years) and had worked on average for 21 years at MGR. The average yearly salary 
of the ex-workers interviewed at MGR was £27,624 or a weekly salary of £514, as 
compared with £404 for a full time worker (£444 for a man) in the West Midlands in 
2005. Approximately 80% of the respondents were married, whilst some 93% were 
home-owners (with 55% still paying a mortgage) in 2008. The composition of our 
sample was highly representative of the demographics and job type of the MG Rover 
workforce as a whole, which enabled a high degree of generalisation of the findings 
(BAILEY et al., 2008). 
The survey data was supplemented with qualitative interview data obtained from ex-
workers (over 20 in total, at the time of writing) and trade union representatives 
(three, in total). These interviews were conducted between July 2008 and April 2009 
and consisted of semi-structured sessions which lasted for approximately 30 
minutes, in which issues highlighted in the survey could be further explored.  
In addition, approximately 30 one-hour semi-structured interviews with regional and 
local policy makers and community activists were conducted throughout 2008 and 
2009 to explore the socio-economic impact of closure on local communities and the 
policy response to these.   
Context: Birmingham and the Region’s Labour Market 
As inferred from the previous section, the closure of MGR and its impact on 
Birmingham and the wider West Midlands cannot be considered in isolation, but 
rather must be considered against a backdrop of structural change and on-going 
labour market stagnation. In the West Midlands this specifically pertains to the 
demise of volume-based manufacturing in the region and the impact of the current 
economic downturn. Between 1965 and 1981, Birmingham and the West Midlands 
lost approximately 370,000 manufacturing jobs, and from 1971 to 1981 over 40% of 
the city’s auto-related jobs were lost (SPENCER et al., 1986). This process has 
continued into recent years: LARKIN (2009) found that between 1998 and 2007 the 
number of private sector jobs in Birmingham fell by 55,500, while the number of 
public sector jobs increased by 80,900. Although the service sector grew rapidly in 
this period (and now accounts for 80% of jobs in Birmingham), these new jobs have 
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been quite diverse ranging from high level professional services to relatively low-paid 
(often part-time) work in retail or wholesaling. Birmingham has clearly been 
struggling relative to the rest of the West Midlands and the UK overall, a situation 
reinforced by the unemployment rate scenario outlined in Table 1 (i.e., at the time of 
the third wave survey).  
Table 1: Unemployment (ILO) rates (% working age) by UAD/LA: July 2007 to 
June 2008 
Northfield (constituency) n/a (4% of all residents claimed Job 
Seekers Allowance) 
Birmingham 9.4 
Sandwell 8.8 
Dudley 6.5 
Walsall 7.5 
Wolverhampton 9.5 
Bromsgrove 4.0 
WEST MIDLANDS (region) 6.2 
UK 5.2 
Source: NOMIS local labour market data (2008).  
This situation of relative labour market insecurity was further reinforced by a high 
incidence of those receiving unemployment benefit (then called Jobseekers’ 
Allowance), with the West Midlands having the highest rate of any region in the UK 
and Birmingham the second highest Local Authority (NOMIS local labour market 
statistics). Thus, whilst 75% of the sample had entered full-time employment by April 
2008 (see below), the external labour market context remained fragile for most. 
Follow-up interviews conducted with a number of respondents who were employed 
in April 2008 reinforced this; with some since having been made redundant as a 
result of the current downturn. Aggregate labour market statistics confirm this, with 
official unemployment rates in the West Midlands increasing by some 50% between 
2008 and 2010. If one considers hidden unemployment in the form of those 
economically inactive but wanting a job, then the “real” rate of joblessness in the 
West Midlands becomes more in the order of 20%, as depicted in Table 2. This is 
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highly concentrated in pockets of deprivation, where people have been unable to 
cope with the structural change that has unfolded around them.  
Table 2: Official and “Real” Unemployment Rates (% working age) by Local 
Authority July 2007 to June 2012 
Local 
Authority 
July 2007- 
June 2008 
July 2011 – June 2012 
 % 
unemployed 
(% of 
economically 
active) 
No. 
Unemployed 
% 
Unemploy
ed (% of 
economica
lly active) 
No. 
Economicall
y Inactive 
Want Job 
Adjusted 
unemployment 
rate (%) 
Birmingham 9.4% 61,200 13.6% 39,300 20.5% 
Coventry - 13,600 8.9% 11,000 15.2% 
Sandwell 8.8% 17,600 12.8% 7,000 16.9% 
Wolverham
pton 
9.5% 14,300 13.2% 6,300 17.9% 
Bromsgrove 4.0% 2,500 5.5% 3,300 11.7% 
Source: NOMIS http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/la/2038431938/report.aspx  
Note to Table 2: Adjusted unemployment rate is calculated by adding those 
’economically inactive want job’ to those officially ‘unemployed’ and then dividing by 
augmented labour force (official labour force plus ‘economically inactive want job’) x 
100. 
Key Findings 
It needs to be borne in mind just how calamitous the sudden redundancies of 6,000 
people could have been for the region.8 Yet our findings suggest that at one level, 
adjustment for the ex-MG Rover workforce before the recession impacted had been 
successful; with approximately 90% of ex-MGR workers having obtained some form 
of employment in April 2008: with nearly three-quarters employed full-time, 11% self-
                                                            
8 It should be noted that the Rover workforce had already been reduced by some 6000 under BMW ownership, 
with a similar reduction in employment numbers at Longbridge under Phoenix ownership. This ‘cushioned’ the 
final effect to some extent in that fewer workers were laid off, but also meant that workers being made 
redundant in the final collapse entered a labour market already swelled by ex MG Rover workers (see below).  
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employed and 5% employed part-time. In contrast, only 5% were still unemployed 
and looking for work. However, a majority of workers reported facing difficulty in 
finding employment, especially due to the number of people applying for the same 
job, age and lack of skills. Indeed, most workers had to convert to service sector 
work and were using different skills in 2008. Training played an important role in ex-
workers finding new jobs either in giving them confidence or in helping them learning 
new skills. Some 60% of workers interviewed in the third wave survey reported 
having undergone some form of training and education. Two thirds took up the offer 
of free training places offered by local agencies and many others underwent training 
by their new employers. But judged against national levels, it does appear that the 
ex-MGR workers moved into jobs with lower levels of autonomy, challenge and skill 
use, and fewer opportunities for progression than other workers in the UK. 
Overall our research reveals a marked shift away from employment in manufacturing 
towards employment in service industries, mirroring the employment structure found 
in the wider UK economy. However, the proportion of our sample employed in 
manufacturing was still around double that of the regional average at that time as 
Figure 1 shows. 
Figure 1 Re-employment by industry after MG Rover (from BAILEY et al, 2008)9 
 
 
                                                            
9 We are grateful to Caroline Chapain for permission to re-print this figure. 
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This occupational shift is also reflected in the type of skills that workers reported 
using in their current roles. More than 60% of those employed three years on stated 
that in their new jobs they were now using different skills to those they used at MG 
Rover (BAILEY et al, 2008). What was also evident was that the quicker people 
found re-employment post MG Rover, the more likely they were to use the same 
skills as at MG Rover in their new role (ibid). Interestingly, three years on some 
workers had changed occupational level. Roughly a third of workers surveyed 
reported higher occupational level roles three years on as compared to when at MG 
Rover, roughly a third reported a lower occupational status at wave three than they 
did previously, and roughly a third maintained a similar position over time (BAILEY et 
al, 2008).  
The need for workers to change their type of job and/or occupation to find 
employment resulted in significant pay cuts, with average pay falling by £5,640 per 
year in real terms by 2008. Two thirds of workers suffered wage falls while a third 
reported an increase in their salaries. The jobs at MG Rover were high quality 
manufacturing jobs paying above the average for the West Midlands region so it was 
always likely that workers would not be able to find directly comparable work. 
Overall, the 31% of workers who stayed within the manufacturing sector earned 
similar amounts of money, but the 60% who moved into the service sector were 
mostly earning less. People who found work in four sectors - wholesale and retail, 
real estate and business services, education, and health and social work - took 
average cuts of more than £6,000 in annual income. This had repercussion in terms 
of households’ finances. Almost a quarter of workers surveyed reported that they 
were in debt or were drawing down savings; 36% said they were just about able to 
manage on their current incomes; and a further 38% said they were in a position to 
save some money. 
A more positive feature of this paper was that a majority of workers retrained to 
increase their employment opportunities or to change career or job. This was evident 
in that some 35% decided to retrain to increase their employment opportunities, 24% 
to change career, and 13% as a requirement of their new job.  In contrast, only 8% 
took up training as an alternative to unemployment (and 7% because they were 
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simply unable to find work with their qualifications). Of those workers who undertook 
training, around a half trained towards a recognised academic qualification (mostly 
vocational in nature). The very fact that ex-workers pursued specific forms of 
academic and vocational training in a range of demanded skills may help to explain 
some of this paper’s key findings, notably the positive uptake of training 
opportunities, in contrast to research on other plant closures.10  
 
In terms of specific support offered, job fairs and information on job opportunities 
generally were seen as not very helpful by respondents. In contrast, the free training 
places were generally seen as helpful, although the initial training assessment was 
less well received. Overall, though, these developments would suggest that for many 
workers, the degree of training assistance provided was a positive feature. However, 
as inferred above, skill reproduction entails measures to ensure the continuity of 
manufacturing skills. As such, the issue of skill atrophy and loss of traditional 
manufacturing skills could be problematic for long-term regional economic viability 
(see BAILEY and DE RUYTER, 2012). It is to such issues that we turn next. 
The Nature of the Policy Response and Lessons for Policy 
Having been alerted at the beginning of 2005, the (now-disbanded) Regional 
Development Agency, Advantage West Midlands (AWM), and the national 
government were able to move quickly when MG-Rover finally collapsed, coming 
together to enact the 2nd Rover Taskforce (RTF2). The members of the 2nd Taskforce 
were from a spread of territories, tiers of government and other agencies and 
included the then Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and local Members of 
Parliament (MPs); Local Authorities (among these, Birmingham City Council); Skills 
Agencies such as the Learning and Skills Council; Employer organisations; 
Employers (GKN, and Hadley Industries); Trade Unions; and local universities. 
However, membership was not completely inclusive. Some of the policy 
implementation agencies such as Job Centre Plus, the key government employment 
                                                            
10 For example SHUTTLEWORTH et al. (2005) in their study of workers made redundant at Harland 
and Wolff noted a low take up of training in general skills by redundant workers, but a positive 
outcome on programmes specifically linked to employment. 
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agency responsible for helping people find jobs, did not sit on the Taskforce but were 
on an ‘operational group’, set up to support the work of the Taskforce, instead. The 
DWP (Department for Work and Pensions) were members of the Joint Planning 
Group, but were not members of the Taskforce. HM Revenue and Customs also did 
not appear to formally participate in the Taskforce. 
This Taskforce (RTF2) was set up with the objectives of: helping suppliers to 
maintain operations in the short term, whilst assisting them to diversify; aiding those 
losing their jobs to find new employment; and supporting the broader community. A 
significant aid package worth £176 million was made available, including £50 million 
for retraining (up to level 2 skills) , £40 million in redundancy payments, a £24 million 
loan fund to help otherwise viable businesses, and £41.6 million to support MG-
Rover suppliers to sustain trading. Redundancy payments were made by the 
Redundancy Payments Directorate of the DTI sooner than usual; the Human 
Resources Division of MGR was kept on until December 2005 to assist with this 
work (NAO, 2006). Another £7.6 million was announced by AWM in June 2005 to 
assist with supplier diversification. The tailored support for suppliers proved critical in 
limiting the short term damage to the local economy. For example, a £3.4 million 
Wage Replacement Scheme helped 170 firms and kept approximately 3,000 workers 
in place for the critical weeks following the collapse, with 1,329 ‘confirmed’ jobs 
being saved in this way (RTF2, 2006). The diversification programme put in place by 
the first Taskforce to support firms in the supply chain to diversify their customer 
base proved to be successful when MG Rover eventually collapsed, with far fewer 
jobs lost in the supply chain than had previously been forecast. 
In the immediate aftermath of the closure, the state employment agency Job Centre 
Plus registered at least 5,300 ex MGR workers in 7 days to qualify for benefits. They 
took on 160 extra staff and worked a double shift to do so at the main office near 
Longbridge (NAO, 2006).  Pensions were transferred to the Pension Protection 
Fund. To overcome the problem of being on benefits and the need to train or to take 
a job, rules were relaxed. Help for redundant workers also included job fairs, 
information on job opportunities, help from Job Centre Plus and free places on 
training courses. Help was also offered to spouses and partners to go on training 
courses. Employers were also paid a subsidy to employ ex-Rover workers and 
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efforts were made through a ‘Manufacturing Hub’ to match manufacturing workers 
with jobs available in the sector. A one-stop employment and skills advice centre 
was set up locally, and local colleges put on extra courses. Of these, the most 
helpful support was found from our survey to be free travel to a training course or job 
interview, a free place on a training course, being sent on a training course by a new 
employer and help with setting up a business.  
In this sense, a key policy lesson arising from the MG Rover experience is the need 
for agencies to move swiftly; it is helpful to have knowledge and actions in place 
rather than attempting to ‘fire fight’ after the event. Indeed, when MGR closed in April 
2005, the second MGR Taskforce was able to start work on the day of the closure 
announcement. Such advance preparation work could work well in future closure 
situations, as it is unlikely that a future closure would happen without at least some 
prior warning. There is therefore a need for a ‘permanent capacity’ to deal with these 
issues, as a way of having institutional memory of how things were done. This is 
particularly pertinent given the recent recession and credit crunch and the potential 
for further closures, including of smaller businesses. It was interesting, for example, 
that when the Birmingham van maker LDV went into administration in June 2009, a 
Taskforce was set up immediately, learning from the MGR experience, and staffed 
by some of the same agencies and people. There have been calls to make these 
permanent so as to retain this knowledge and capacity (HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
2009), although this now seems unlikely in the post-election context of the abolition 
of RDAs. Indeed the current Coalition Government’s recent abolition of RDAs poses 
a problem in this sense, as it is not clear that fragmented and competing local 
enterprise partnerships (LEPs) will be able to provide the coordinated leadership 
needed to tackle effectively such situations. 
The economic diversification of Birmingham and the West Midlands in the first half of 
2000s also played an important role in enabling workers to adjust post MGR closure. 
As such, economic diversification should be further encouraged, particularly post 
credit crunch. As CLAYTON (2011) notes, the impact of the current downturn was 
felt differently across different regions of the UK, in turn requiring that labour market 
policies are built on local initiatives and local knowledge. On this note, government 
and regional development agencies (or successor bodies) need to do more to 
17 
 
ensure that employees have the necessary skills to cope as industries change, 
through high quality, flexible education, training, information, and mobility 
programmes (a more ‘Nordic’ approach). Here it needs to be recognised that much 
work was done by Advantage West Midlands and other agencies before the MGR 
closure, in diversifying the supply chain and economy and this work may have 
‘saved’ as many as 10-12,000 jobs in the local automotive industry supply chain at 
the time (MACNEILL and BAILEY, 2010).11  
Avoiding sudden closures and slowing down the process where possible also 
enables workers released to pick up jobs arising through ‘replacement demand’ 
where firms require workers to cover those who have left, retired and so on. Such 
replacement demand can actually be quite significant and in the medium term may 
outweigh negative changes arising from projected decline (ibid). These policy 
suggestions from MGR experience accord with a view of plant closures not as 
discreet one-off events but rather long-term path-dependent processes which begin 
well before the ‘event’ itself and with repercussions continuing well after (PIKE et al, 
2005). From this perspective, there may be critical moments which represent 
significant opportunities for local and regional policy interventions which may alter 
evolutionary trajectories (see BAILEY et al, 2010, on the role of ‘place renewing’ 
leadership in such situations).   
It should be noted that the ‘regional task forces’ set up in England in 2008 were 
modelled on the work of the MG Rover response, but with greater attention to issues 
of ‘place’ as well as ‘people’ and ‘business’. A number of detailed policy interventions 
were developed out of previous experience and learning with MG Rover, and were 
set up quickly in response to the financial crisis, including a loan fund for small firms. 
Furthermore, as BAILEY and BERKELEY (2010) note, the West Midlands response 
to the recession delivered a number of outcomes, underpinned by a detailed 
evidence base, in line with the so-called ‘Barcelona Principles’ (OECD, 2009) notably 
around leadership, strategy, targeted short-term support, building relationships with 
stakeholders and communicating with other tiers of government. For example, the 
process of intelligence gathering and analysis improved markedly, facilitating a more 
                                                            
11 This helped to save jobs in the automotive supply chain – and in small and medium sized firms – but did not 
help Rover workers as such – who were not taken up by the diversification of the supply chain in significant 
numbers. 
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informed understanding of the key economic issues affecting the region.  This in turn 
informed strategic thinking and direction and enabled the RDA to target key locations 
(market towns), sectors (automotive, construction) and firms (SMEs). In so doing, a 
degree of consensus was developed on the need to focus resources. Overall, this 
work triggered a move to more sophisticated way of developing targets for 
intervention and policies to get there.  
 
However, the formation of a coalition government in 2010 saw the abolition of RDAs 
in England (with the exception of that in London). In their place ‘Local Enterprise 
Partnerships’ (LEPs) have emerged at a sub-regional scale. In the West Midlands, 
the RDA has been replaced by six LEPs. Despite a language of ‘localism’, however, 
many of the powers held by English RDAs, for example, on industrial policy and 
business support have actually been recentralised to London (HILDRETH and 
BAILEY, 2013). In addition, unlike RDAs, LEPs have to operate without significant 
dedicated budgets. Moreover, there was also significant expertise built up in the 
RDA in dealing with shocks, which has effectively been lost, making the need for 
cross-LEP working all the more important in anticipating and dealing with economic 
transformation. 
Finally, the ‘success’ story noted earlier in respect of retraining in the case of ex-
MGR workers seems linked to the specific forms of training and education that were 
taken up and which provided skills of use in the local labour market. Training and 
education played a key role in particular in ensuring those who did not find re-
employment quickly were not left unsupported. 
Broader Perspectives 1: Wider Labour Market Precariousness 
As such, the 2nd Rover Taskforce was successful in many respects to facilitate 
adjustment, with partners working well together to devise innovative policies and to 
harness various agencies, with leadership shown by AWM, to help firms in the 
supply chain and to deliver quality services to those made redundant. Indeed, this 
reactive approach to the closure has been seen as something of ‘textbook’ task-force 
response in terms of quickly bringing together different organisations to provide 
support for workers (BAILEY et al., 2008) and helping them into training and onto 
new jobs.  However, our research suggests that this local success in helping workers 
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adapt and move on was in effect mitigated by a broader labour market environment 
that is essentially precarious (BAILEY et al, 2012a).  Reinforcing this has been a lack 
of support for manufacturing more generally in the UK; only 30% of the ex MGR 
workers remained in manufacturing (and these were the workers who managed on 
average to maintain income levels). At the time of writing, the UK economy is 
effectively ‘flat-lining’ after a period when the automotive sector has grown more 
quickly than the rest of the economy (and is forecast to do so after some £6bn worth 
of investment by auto firms over the last two years), but going forward there is an 
acute issue of a shortage of skilled labour in the auto sector which could hold back 
growth.12 The skills atrophy of MGR workers leaving a sector that is growing is 
illustrative of the lack of alignment of local/regional and national level policies. 
Similarly, the public sector (some 20% of employed respondents had jobs in public 
administration, health and education in April 2008) now faces severe cuts. 
Drawing on work by SHUTTLEWORTH et al. (2005), BAILEY et al (2012a) identified 
three dimensions that can be taken into account when examining the employment 
outcomes and trajectories of workers made redundant after a plant closure: (i) the 
personal attributes associated with workers employability and re-absorption in the 
labour market; (ii) the local demand and geographical mobility shaping their 
transition back to employment; and (iii) the effectiveness of the policy interventions, 
their uptake and how were they perceived by the workers. In this previous work 
(BAILEY et al, 2012), we argued that the effectiveness of the immediate post-closure 
policy response and longer term (pre-closure) local economic strategies combined 
with the state of local labour markets and workers’ geographical mobility, helped to 
balance the impacts of personal attributes associated with workers’ employability 
and re-absorption into the labour markets – hence the finding noted above of 90% of 
workers getting back into work three years on and 60% undertaking some form of 
training. In this regard, this was a ‘successful’ policy response. 
However, in line with the precariousness framework of STANDING (1997, 2011), we 
would argue that this ‘success’ has to some extent been undermined more generally 
                                                            
12 BRYSON and RUSTEN (2010), for example, suggest that there will be some 90,000 hard-to-fill 
manufacturing jobs in the West Midlands region alone that could be filled by people with the right 
skills and expertise. 
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by the wider labour market conditions into which workers have had to move.13 Here, 
there were significant falls in a number of measures such as labour market security 
(the security that comes from a government commitment to full employment), income 
security and representation security (representation rights at work) – which we see 
as dimensions of precariousness in line with Standing’s work. In this regard, the 
particular lack of attention to labour market security has undermined and conflicted 
with other dimensions of security. Indeed, many workers interviewed in our Wave 3 
survey were also likely to have lost their jobs again during the most recent downturn, 
reflecting the precariousness of the work they had to move into. Overall, we would 
argue that successful policy adjustments extend beyond merely providing “jobs” or 
“job opportunities” for displaced workers as politicians have stressed. Rather, they 
extend to the quality of employment and lasting career opportunities. On that, the 
research presented here suggests that the picture for ex MG Rover workers is at 
best very mixed. For example, on the dimension of income security, our research 
found a majority of respondents reporting a significant decline in earnings compared 
to when they worked at MGR; and further that a quarter of respondents reported that 
they were experiencing financial difficulties. The findings also indicated a much 
greater dispersion of earnings. The decline in representation security reported also 
highlights the need to make sure that workers have adequate redress to advice and 
advocacy (traditionally provided by the union movement); and that measures are put 
in place to avoid a repeat of very sudden plant closures. 
The implications of this analysis is that positive developments in labour security at 
the micro level can be undermined by adverse developments in labour market 
security at the macro-level; in turn compounding income, representation and skill 
reproduction insecurity. As such, low pay is the norm for many in the workforce and 
that more needs to be done to “make work pay” (ARMSTRONG et al., 2008) and link 
this to training and skills development - and supporting manufacturing as a provider 
of skilled, quality jobs in general. As the follow-up interviews demonstrated, concerns 
over tenure and income security are even more important now, given the recent 
economic downturn and consequent fiscal austerity practiced by the coalition 
government. All of these developments can be expected to have exacerbated the 
                                                            
13 Terms such as flexibilisation and casualization appear to be more commonly used by 
researchers writing in English, rather than precariousness and precarity (ARNOLD and BONGIOVI, 
2013). 
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essentially precarious nature of the wider UK labour market for many workers. In this 
sense we would highlight the lack of employment security as effectively undermining 
some otherwise successful policy responses. Successful adjustment in 2008 was no 
guarantee that a worker could not have been made redundant again with the onset 
of the economic downturn. Further research is therefore needed to explore the 
impact of both the most recent recession and the current austere economic 
environment on the labour market outcomes experienced by workers. 
Broader Perspectives 2: The Local Impact and Community Responses 
Our findings suggest implications and lessons for cities dependent on manufacturing 
during difficult times of economic adjustment, and hence urban policy. As could be 
expected, the areas around the MG Rover plant in the Longbridge and Northfield 
areas of Birmingham were particularly affected by the closure. Approximately 20% of 
workers lived in south-west Birmingham at the time of the closure. Immediately, 
these areas had to deal with a significant increase in the number of unemployed 
people, the removal of a major employer and generator of activity and expenditure, a 
loss in their community identity, and a massive site to regenerate. In addition to 
affecting workers living in the area, the closure had ripple effects; for example, 
people already unemployed now had to compete with ex-MG Rover workers coming 
into the labour market, thereby resulting in an increase in long term unemployment. 
Some shops and restaurants closed while others experienced a decrease in their 
business activity, given reduced local spending. This occurred in a locality in which 
the direction of travel of key indicators of multiple deprivation was already negative 
following a generation of in-situ employment decline at MG Rover and other major 
employers such as Cadbury. Place is thus vital as different places have different 
histories, path dependencies and trajectories that affect their capacity to absorb the 
shock of closure and to build for the future. Hence, dealing with plant closures as 
part of a broader strategy to maintain the economic vitality of traditional automotive 
industry cities needs to acknowledge the differential geographies of place.  
The policy response to the Longbridge crisis can also be characterised in terms of a 
set of shifting agendas and stakeholder coalitions that reflect an institutional divide 
between regional economic stakeholders (and the Taskforce), on the one hand, 
whose remit was to secure the regional supply chain and support the redundant 
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workers, and neighbourhood social partners on the other, whose role was the 
mitigation of the local impacts of closure and facilitating future regeneration. It is 
possible to argue that the Taskforce narrative represents only a partial account of the 
Longbridge experience.  As noted, rather than just focusing on the Taskforce 
responses, alternative narratives are needed so as to offer a more nuanced and 
holistic account, including the local impacts of closure, the role of the neighbourhood 
level officials and the third sector in mediating these.  
Such local impacts include the “displacement” effect of the sudden increase in labour 
supply in South West Birmingham. In the decade prior to closure, the local 
unemployment (claimant) rate declined by half (CURS, 2008). However, two years 
after closure, in the context of strong employment growth nationally, the proportion of 
local job seekers unemployed for more than 12 months had increased from 17% to 
24% (ibid.). There was also significant local resentment that the short term needs of 
ex MGR workers were prioritised over the long term needs of the pre-existing 
workless population.  Equally important was the diminishing MGR worker spending 
on local shops and services. Six months after closure, declining local retail turnover,  
loss of commercial validity of local centres and increased rates of anti-social 
behaviour were noted (BCC, 2005).  
The challenge of mitigating such neighbourhood and social impacts of closure fell to 
Birmingham City Council’s constituency and neighbourhood office staff. This role is 
diminished in the Taskforce centric narrative presented above.  They offered 
emergency counselling (e.g. benefit advice, debt counselling) via a telephone hotline 
to the redundant workers, in addition to their normal role of advising the local public 
on housing, welfare and other social issues. Staff reported difficulty in imparting a 
human dimension to the response amidst the sheer level of demand (HALL, 2012). 
The council proved a deficient vehicle for this support role. It had a limited “tool kit” 
(Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit, free school dinners) given the depth of the 
crisis. Most fundamentally, however, the abruptness and magnitude of the closure 
threatened to exceed the competences of council staff to deal with shocked 
redundant workers, many of whom required very basic support before they could 
enter the elaborate benefits system (ibid).  
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The key public stakeholders sought, where possible, to deliver short term measures 
for vocational training, social and leisure activities and longer term regeneration 
through local voluntary and community sector intermediaries. However, the locality 
had, in its recent history, been dominated by large paternalistic employers (Cadbury, 
MG Rover), around which employees’ social life revolved, and direct municipal 
provision (e.g. the domination of the local housing market by the social rented 
sector). This engendered a parochial and complacent culture of jobs, community and 
homes ‘for life’. Social capital and entrepreneurship in the locality were strong, but 
very much internalised within the firm and family (SMITH, 1989). The quality and 
quantity of local third sector amenities was poor (BCC, 2008). There were few local 
groups involved in social enterprise, including a single credit union and only the 
Longbridge Area Resource Centre (LARC) engaged in employment support activity.  
The statutory agencies had sought to build capacity in the third sector locally. The 
South West Birmingham Community Association was established in 1997 to provide 
a focus for representation and liaison for local groups. The MGR Community Support 
Board was established in response to closure to develop leisure, vocational training 
and outreach work. Evolving from this, Community Network South West, a European 
Union part funded project (2006 to 2008), offered capacity building support to local 
groups through its Equip and Enable scheme. However, the third sector lacked a 
single vision or voice. The strategy exposed the structural weaknesses of the sector 
locally. Very few local bodies possessed the necessary organisational competence, 
probity and accountability required by the rules, regulations and timescales of the 
statutory funders and, as a consequence, significant contracts were awarded to 
larger, national agencies.   
A wholly new community organisation, the Rover Community Action Trust (RCAT) 
was established in autumn 2005 by a group of Rover wives. RCAT represented the 
same “community of interest” targeted by the Taskforce. RCAT was financed in the 
first instance, by proceeds from a charity Birmingham City football match. RCAT very 
quickly acquired a prominent political profile, not least due to its direct and assertive 
lobbying of central government (circumventing even the Task Force), amidst the 
acute sensitivities of the 2005 UK General Election campaign. It secured £2.6 million 
for training, social and leisure uses through the tailor made “Step Forward” 
programme, although this was also undermined by the “programme management” 
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mentality of the statutory funding agencies. RCAT’s prominent political profile and 
lobbying success of RCAT led it to eclipse the pre-existing community actors in the 
Longbridge narrative. The Task Force partners invested considerable capital into the 
embryonic association, effectively co-opting it into the coalition of key actors. As 
such, it was obliged to undergo a difficult transition from a radical ‘campaigning’ to a 
mainstream ‘doing’ orientation; a common trajectory for third sector organisations.  
In summary, the ability of South West Birmingham to respond to the closure was 
constrained by the legacy of long-term in situ decline and limited local social capital – 
the later attributable to the historic dominance of large ‘paternalistic’ employers 
which have run down over time. The Taskforce model indeed proved effective within 
its particular remit but was limited in scope (BENTLEY et. al., 2010b). Its focus (on 
ex MG Rover workers and the supply chain), its composition (economic development 
agencies) and lines of accountability (to sponsor ministries) meant that it was poorly 
placed to deal with broader social and economic impacts. Nevertheless, Birmingham 
City Council and local social partners attempted to fill that void.  
Conclusions 
This paper has offered an overview of the findings of research on the collapse of MG 
Rover in Birmingham in 2005, and has explored its socio-economic impacts and the 
associated policy responses. Given the salience of such issues in the light of 
automotive plant closures in a number of countries, the paper highlights what key 
lessons could be learned from what happened before, during and after the MG 
Rover closure in 2005 and the work of the Taskforce in tackling this ‘crisis’ situation. 
However, noting that regions are ‘meeting places’ for local and global forces and 
debates (BRISTOW, 2010), we have also attempted to move beyond the ‘standard’ 
Taskforce narrative, recognising that whilst significant policy ‘successes’ were 
evident at the regional level in anticipating and responding to the crisis, a broader 
perspective is required that situates this Taskforce response in (i) a broader – 
nationally driven - context of labour market precariousness (that in turn mitigates 
some of its policy ‘successes’), and (ii) more local perspectives that highlight the 
local impacts of closure, the role of the neighbourhood level officials and the third 
sector in mediating these, plus the longer term regeneration challenge following the 
Taskforce’s departure.   
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It is correct to note that rapid action by regional and local agencies as part of a 
coordinated response by policymakers to support, inform and retrain the MG Rover 
workers who lost their jobs can be called a ‘success story’ in that large-scale, long-
term unemployment in the south Birmingham and wider West Midlands area was 
avoided. However, taking this broader perspective suggests that longer term, 
workers face a precarious situation and the need for policies to create and sustain 
‘good quality’ jobs remains paramount. Adding in more local perspectives, and the 
key lesson from the Longbridge experience for dealing with closures more generally 
is that public policy responses to closures must be: multi-dimensional in that they 
transcend narrow sector based concerns and addresses broader spatial impacts, 
inclusive in that they build on a broad coalition of economic and social stakeholders; 
and, long-term in that they acknowledge that adaptation takes many years. These 
may seem truisms but the Birmingham Longbridge experience demonstrates the 
difficulty of achieving such responses in the context of crisis where action is 
imperative and deliberation a luxury.  
Furthermore, the Taskforce was clearly effective in its own terms but narrow in scope 
and time limited. Neighbourhood and social impacts were not included within its 
tightly defined brief. The responsibility for these problems was shouldered by less 
well-resourced organisations. So, looking more locally, while a local authority is a 
necessary actor in such a response, it is an imperfect vehicle given its very specific 
and restricted powers (at least in the British case – that may be different in other 
countries). Interviews with local authority staff reported a mismatch in their skills sets 
(the benefit system, debt advice) and the immediate needs of shocked and 
disoriented redundant workers (the need for remedial ‘human’ counselling). The local 
authority response was also restricted by a paucity of local voluntary and community 
sector organisations through which to channel programmes of assistance. 
Conversely, local third sector groups were frustrated by the rules, regulations and 
‘project management’ mind-set of major statutory organisations which, it can be 
argued, prioritised expenditure within prescribed timescales over innovation and 
investment for the future. If anything, the Longbridge experience illustrates the value 
for cities in investing in a vibrant third sector over the longer term. 
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